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ABSTRACT
Although tsunamis have the potential to be extremely destructive, relatively little research on tsunami
messaging has taken place. Discovering whether tsunami warning messages can be written in a way that leads
to increased protective response is crucial, particularly given the increased use of mobile message services and
the role they play in notifying the public of imminent threats such as tsunami and other hazards. The purpose
of this study was to examine the possibility of designing warning messages for tsunamis that improve upon
message style and content used by public alerting agencies to date and to gain insight that can be applied to
other hazards. This study tested the impact of tsunami messages that varied in length and content on six
message outcomes—understanding, believing, personalizing, deciding, milling, and fear. Relative to the short
message, revised messages resulted in significantly more understanding and deciding, known precursors to
taking protective action under threat. The revised message also resulted in significantly more fear, which is
believed to influence behavioral intentions. Findings suggest that shorter messages may not deliver enough
content to inform message receivers about the threat they face and the protective actions they should perform.
Longer messages delivered with more specific information about the location of impact, threat-associated
risks, and recommended protective actions were associated with better message outcomes, including quicker
intended response. Recommendations for future tsunami warnings are provided.

1. Introduction
In the last five decades, a number of significant tsunamis have occurred worldwide, capturing the interest
of international agencies tasked with motivating preparedness for tsunamis and warning the public at risk.
Tsunamis usually occur after significant underwater
earthquakes or landslides and consist of a series of
powerful ocean waves. In December 2004, a magnitude9.0 earthquake in the Indian Ocean created a tsunami
that resulted in more than 225 000 deaths. In March
2011, an earthquake and tsunami off the coast of Japan
resulted in more than 15 000 deaths and one of the worst
nuclear disasters to date. Although the United States
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has not experienced a significant tsunami recently, both
Hawaii (1960 Hilo Tsunami) and Alaska (1964 Good
Friday Earthquake) have experienced destructive tsunamis within the last 100 years resulting in preventable
loss of life had adequate warning systems been in place
(National Research Council 2011b). Furthermore, the
potential exists for destructive tsunamis along much of
the Pacific West Coast (Geist et al. 2004) where sizable
coastal populations are placed at risk (Wood 2007;
Wood and Soulard 2008).
Previous research has established that warning messages have the potential to reduce life loss during severe
events like tsunamis by encouraging individuals to take
protective action (Mileti and Sorensen 1990; Lindell and
Prater 2010). However, little research provides guidance
for the design and content of effective tsunami warning
messages. Although much research has been conducted
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on warnings in general (Mileti and Sorensen 1990),
only a handful of studies have focused on tsunami
warning messages, including their content, style, and
structure (Gregg et al. 2012a; Sutton and Woods 2016).
In addition, the changing media environment—in particular the advent of short message systems—has
changed the ways in which warning messages can be
sent. Much of the prior research on warnings assumes
that officials will use the Emergency Alerting System
(EAS), which has a relatively long message capacity
(1380 characters; Drabek 1999). However, warning
messages are increasingly sent on social media platforms, such as Twitter, which restricts messages to 140
characters, and the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA)
service, which sends 90-character, geographically targeted messages directly to individual mobile phones
(National Research Council 2011a). For tsunamis, especially those triggered by major, near-field sources,
which offer little time to take protective action, short
messaging systems that deliver content to geotargeted
areas may be a primary strategy for warning populations at
risk (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
2016). Such platforms allow messages to reach people
quickly and can potentially increase the amount of time
people have available to take protective action. Unfortunately, only one study that we know of has examined
the effectiveness of these shorter messages compared to
longer messages (Wood et al. 2015), and it did not focus
on tsunamis.
In this paper, we build upon existing research by
testing tsunami messages for a distant-source tsunami
with members of the public. In doing so, we expand
Mileti’s (1999) warning response model to include
message length, as a feature of message style, and fear,
as an affective response to message content. Based on
our findings, we identify messaging strategies to improve
the effectiveness of future tsunami warnings.

2. Literature review
a. Research on tsunami warning messages
There has been considerable research on understanding tsunami risk perception (Anderson 1969; Johnston
et al. 2005), preparedness (Lindell and Prater 2010), and
response to recent events (Wilson et al. 2011, 2013). However, in 2011, the National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) conducted a review on
tsunami warning and preparedness and identified a
lack of research on evidence-based messages (National
Research Council 2011b); specifically focusing on message
design features including message content that has
demonstrated likelihood for increasing protective action
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taking among those at risk. While preevent education
about natural cues, personal preparedness, and response,
such as plans for evacuation and reunification, is vitally
important for decreasing loss of life during a local source
tsunami event (Johnston et al. 2005; Esteban et al. 2013),
preparedness efforts must be supplemented by warning
messages that can persuade individuals to act quickly for
both local-source and distant-source tsunami events. The
NAS report also noted the need for research on messages
delivered via next-generation technologies such as mobile devices or social media applications that can extend
the reach of messages across networks.
Since then Gregg et al. (2012) and C. Gregg et al. (2012,
unpublished report) undertook two studies on behalf of
the NOAA tsunami program. The first included focus
groups with community stakeholders including leaders in
business, government, civic organizations, and emergency response agencies, including emergency managers
(Gregg et al. 2012). In this study, participants rated the
characteristics of the content and style of tsunami bulletins, discussed the strengths and weaknesses of existing
message products, and identified sources and channels by
which they had previously received tsunami information.
The second study was an evaluative review of 37 NOAA
tsunami products, including warning messages, conducted by a team of social scientists. Based on the variables
identified in the warning response model (Mileti and
Sorensen 1990), the investigators developed a ‘‘tsunami
message metric’’ consisting of 21 factors that described
message content, style, order, formatting, and receiver
characteristics (C. Gregg et al. 2012, unpublished report).
Together, these two studies resulted in recommended
changes to 1) message formatting and organization of
existing material (Gregg et al. 2012) and 2) content order
and style to improve readability (C. Gregg et al. 2012,
unpublished report). Suggested changes included moving
the ‘‘most important information’’ up front in the message (Gregg et al. 2012, p. ii) and using clearer language
for recommended actions and expected impacts of a
tsunami (C. Gregg et al. 2012, unpublished report).
More recently, Sutton and Woods (2016) conducted
focus group research with members of the public to
identify gaps in sense making about tsunami warning
messages. Focus group participants, none of whom had
any direct experience with tsunami, reviewed an NWS
tsunami message that had previously been distributed to
populations at risk along the coast of Northern California during the 2011 Tohoku tsunami (a distant
source tsunami) and discussed their cognitive and
emotional responses to message content and style
characteristics. Findings from the focus groups were
consistent with those reported by Gregg et al. (2012) and
C. Gregg et al. (2012, unpublished report). Focus group
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participants consistently expressed confusion about the
hazard threat, hazard impact, and recommended protective actions owing to the lack of details about the
potential severity of tsunamis and their personal susceptibility. Furthermore, they indicated that the lack of
specificity in describing the location of impact significantly affected their ability to make a decision about
taking action. That is, they were unable to determine
whether they were personally susceptible to the threat.
In addition, several participants reported feeling extremely anxious owing to their inability to determine
whether they or their loved ones were personally at risk.

b. Warning messages
The goal of a warning message is to overcome people’s belief in their own safety (i.e., the optimism bias)
and then guide them to take protective actions
(Burningham et al. 2008). Prior research on warnings for
imminent threats and disaster has shown that effective
messages result in a series of cognitive shifts as individuals make sense of changing situations and that
influence their intent to take protective action (Lindell
and Perry 2012; Mileti and Sorensen 1990). These shifts
begin as individuals 1) understand what the warning
means for them, 2) believe the risk, and 3) personalize
the risk. These shifts occur in the context of 4) milling,
that is, searching for and confirming information, resulting in a 5) decision to take protective action. Mileti
(1999) argued that public warning systems that take
these mental and social processes into account are more
likely to help at-risk publics.
Understanding is the process of comprehending the
meaning of the message (Drost et al. 2016). Believing
the message is to trust that what is being communicated
is accurate (Mileti and Peek 2000). Personalization is the
process of individuals’ recognizing that they are susceptible to the threat (Wood et al. 2017; Nigg 1987).
Personalization plays a crucial role in warning response
as it has been linked to an increased likelihood of taking
protective action (Casteel 2016; Mileti and Peek 2000;
Perry 1979; Perry et al. 1981). Throughout the warning
period, message receivers have an increased likelihood
of engaging in milling. Milling consists of informal interactions with others to search for additional information (Drabek 1986; Lindell and Perry 2004, 2012).
Finally, message receivers decide what action to take in
response to the warning message (Wood et al. 2017).
The warning response model does not, however,
consider how fear affects these cognitive shifts and what
role this emotion may play in the decision to take protective action. Fear is a negative emotion that is accompanied by high levels of arousal (Witte 1992). It is often
operationalized as feeling anxious (at lower levels).
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Warnings have the potential to evoke anxiety, especially
if individuals are confused by the message (Sutton and
Woods 2016). For example, in one study, focus group
participants indicated that the lack of specificity in the
location of impact significantly affected their ability to
make a decision about taking action. As a result, participants could not determine if they were personally susceptible to the threat. This inability to determine the
personal impact of the threat resulted in verbal expressions of anxiety and fear. The emotional response was not
due to the content that was present in the message, but
rather, what was absent. Those expressing fear said they
would need to seek additional information to confirm the
impact (Sutton and Woods 2016). While research on fear
appeals, guided by Witte’s (1994) extended parallel processing model (EPPM), suggests that fear may be a motivating emotion (Witte 1992; Peters et al. 2013), especially
when individuals believe that they know how to take
protective action (i.e., perceived efficacy), the relationship
between fear and warning messages has yet to be studied.
The research record on warning messages demonstrates that the intrinsic features of warning messages
influence the nonaffective cognitive shifts described
above (e.g., Bean et al. 2016; Mileti and O’Brien 1992).
This body of research suggests that warning messages
that contain five key content features (i.e., hazard, guidance, location, time, and source) are more effective. As
these features are described in detail elsewhere (Mileti
and Sorensen 1990), we provide brief definitions here.
Effective messages must contain information about the
hazard including a description of physical characteristics
of the threat, as well as its potential impact and effects
(Covello 1998; Drabek 1999; Mileti and Peek 2000).
Warning messages should also provide guidance, which
includes information about the actions people need to
take to increase their safety (Lindell and Perry, 1992; Mileti
and Sorensen 1990). Public warning messages must also
identify the location of the threat, including the geographical and physical boundaries (Greene et al. 1981;
Nigg 1987) and the populations at risk. Messages should
contain information about time, that is, when individuals
need to initiate protective actions and the amount of time
they have available in which to do so (Drabek and Boggs
1968; Perry et al. 1981; Mileti and Sorensen 1990). And
finally, messages must also indicate the source or sources
initiating and sending the warning (Casteel 2016; Mayhorn
and McLaughlin 2014).
In addition to these content variables, the style of the
warning affects message interpretation (Mileti and Peek
2000). According to the warning response model, the style
of warnings should be specific, in that the warning should
provide precise information and details (Drabek and Boggs
1968; Mayhorn and McLaughlin 2014; Mileti and Sorensen

78

WEATHER, CLIMATE, AND SOCIETY

1990). Warnings should be consistent within and across
messages (Mileti and Peek 2000; Mileti and Sorensen 1990).
Messages should employ clear language that is simple and
straightforward (Drabek and Stephenson 1971; Quarantelli
1984). Information also should be conveyed with certainty,
even when the actual impact may be uncertain and conditions are changing (Mileti and Peek 2000). Finally, messages
should be accurate in that the information is timely and
complete (Mileti and Sorensen 1990).

c. New warning technologies and message length
One feature of warning messages that has become
particularly relevant because of evolving technologies is
the length (National Research Council 2011a). Although WEA- and Twitter-based warning messages
have the potential to reach people quickly, the character
constraints of these systems (90 and 140, respectively)
force officials to write short messages. Logistically, these
messages may not contain enough characters to allow
emergency managers to include the five types of content
identified by the warning response model (Mileti 1999).
Existing research on short messages has found that relative to longer 1380-character messages, shorter messages
resulted in poorer message outcomes (Bean et al. 2014,
2016). A recent study (Wood et al. 2017) found that the
amount of information contained in a message was positively associated with message understanding and deciding
and negatively associated with response delay.
One possible solution is to use the distributed practice
strategy (Seabrook et al. 2005; Underwood 1961). This
strategy suggests that sequenced presentation of information yields better understanding than massed presentation,
or cramming. In the context of Twitter or WEA messages,
this strategy would require that longer messages be broken
up into a series of digestible, sequenced messages. Breaking
up messages may make them easier to understand. Wogalter
and Mayhorn (2005) argued that safety-related information could be learned, or understood, more efficiently when
presented in shortened presentations distributed across
time. Taken together, this research suggests that sequenced
messages should be as effective as nonsequenced messages
and more effective than short messages.
In this study, we advance research on warning messages
in general, and on tsunami warning messages in particular,
by examining the ways in which message content and
length affect 1) key outcomes of the warning response
model and 2) the affective outcome, fear, an understudied
emotional reaction to warning messages.

3. Method
An online experiment comparing outcomes for four
different public tsunami warning messages was conducted
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using a posttest only, between-subjects design. Participants
gave informed consent and then were presented with one
of four randomly assigned warning messages about a
distant-source tsunami event off the California coast. All
four messages informed the participants about the tsunami
and encouraged them to take protective action. After
viewing the randomly assigned message, participants were
asked to imagine how they would feel if they had received
the message on their phone and were then asked a series of
questions. The study protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board at a large university.

a. Participants
A volunteer sample (N 5 401) was drawn from an
online survey audience panel of individuals recruited for
experiment participation in exchange for ‘‘points’’ in a
no-cash, point system of rewards, including sweepstakes
and merchandise. The panel included a diverse group of
individuals who have Internet access and have joined the
audience panel to take surveys. Eligible panel members
were invited by e-mail to participate, and invitations
were sent to provide general balance in terms of gender.
To be eligible to participate in this study, individuals had
to be 1) 18 years of age or older, 2) U.S. residents, and
3) English speakers.
Given that the tested messages were about a hypothetical tsunami occurring in California, most participants (96%) were drawn from within the state, largely
from coastal regions. Warning messages may be received by nonresident visitors to a given area; thus
additional participants were drawn from out of state
(4%) to reflect visitors to coastal areas who may be
unfamiliar with the tsunami hazard. In general, demographic characteristics were similar to those of California residents (U.S. Census Bureau 2017), although
Hispanic residents were underrepresented. Demographic
characteristics of the sample are provided (Table 1). Just
over half the participants were women (54%); the median
age was 38 years. The majority (54%; n 5 215) selfidentified as white, 21% (n 5 84) as Hispanic/Latino,
15% (n 5 62) as Asian/Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander,
7% (n 5 27) as black or African American, and 3%
(n 5 13) as some other group.

b. Materials
Four messages were tested: 1) an actual federal
agency message (‘‘standard’’), 2) a revised specificityand clarity-enhanced message (‘‘revised’’), 3) a short,
length-constrained message (‘‘constrained’’), and 4) the
specificity- and clarity-enhanced revised message delivered
as a sequenced set of shorter messages (‘‘sequenced’’). The
standard message was an actual distant-source tsunami
warning message that was issued by the National Weather
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TABLE 1. Sample Characteristics.
Conditiona
Total
(N 5 401)

Characteristic

Standard
(n 5 113)

Revised
(n 5 111)

Constrained
(n 5 93)

Sequenced
(n 5 84)

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

Sex
Male
Female

183
218

46
54

52
61

46
54

41
70

37
63

51
42

55
45

39
45

46
54

Race/ethnicity
African American/black
Asian
Hispanic/Latino
White
Other

27
62
84
215
13

7
15
21
54
3

10
13
25
60
5

9
12
22
53
4

6
23
23
58
1

5
21
21
52
1

3
17
20
48
5

3
18
22
52
5

8
9
16
49
2

10
11
19
58
2

Ageb
Younger (18–54 years)
Older (551 years)

339
62

84
16

98
15

87
13

100
11

90
10

73
20

78
22

68
16

81
19

Income
$0–$74,999
$75,000 and more

240
161

60
40

70
43

62
38

70
41

63
37

52
41

56
44

48
36

57
43

Live in California
Yes
No

386
15

96
4

111
2

98
2

107
4

96
4

86
7

92
8

82
2

98
2

Comfort using cell phone
No
Yes

34
367

8
92

11
102

10
90

8
103

7
93

11
82

12
88

4
80

5
95

Disaster experience
Low
High

156
245

39
61

42
71

37
63

42
69

38
62

34
59

37
63

38
46

45
55

Prior mobile alert
Yes
No

252
149

63
37

70
43

62
38

73
38

66
34

52
41

56
44

57
27

68
32

a2
(N-1 DF)
b

was nonsignificant for each participant characteristic, indicating that there were no baseline differences between treatment groups.
Median age was 38 years.

Service in Eureka, California, on 11 March 2011, in
response to the Tohoku Tsunami event that occurred
off the coast of Japan and provided the basis for discussion in prior focus group research (Sutton and
Woods 2016). This message served as the control. The
revised message was a revision of the standard NWS
message based on the findings from four focus groups
held in October 2014 (Sutton and Woods 2016). The
revised message included changes to specify characteristics about the hazard threat and potential impact,
clearly identify the location of impact using city names,
and specify the recommended protective actions. The
message content was also reorganized to improve
message clarity and specificity, per the warning response model (Mileti and Sorensen 1990). The constrained message was a 140-character warning message
that included all five content features in a condensed
form. The sequenced message was the revised warning

message presented as a sequence of eleven 140-character
messages. All messages were written in capital letters to
mimic NWS style and were reviewed by an outside expert. See the appendix for message text.

c. Procedure and data analysis
After informed consent procedures, participants were
presented with the following scenario:
Imagine that you are on vacation on the coast in Humboldt, California. It’s 10:20 in the morning. You are home
alone, and you just received the following message on
your mobile/cellular phone. (If you do not have a mobile/
cell phone, imagine that you do.) This is what you see
when you view the message.

Participants were then presented with an image of a cell
phone containing a randomly assigned message (standard, revised, constrained, or sequenced). After reading
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TABLE 2. Scale descriptive statistics (N 5 401).
Scale

Mean

Std dev

Skew

Kurtosis

No. of items

Cronbach’s a

Understanding
Belief
Personalization
Milling
Deciding
Minutes to take action
Fear

4.70
4.81
4.34
4.55
4.76
155.11
4.78

1.13
1.25
1.29
1.37
1.33
113.76
1.67

20.89
21.28
20.63
20.97
21.06
1.38
20.54

0.59
1.43
20.06
0.37
0.62
0.96
20.33

7
3
7
1
1
2
3

0.94
0.92
0.94
—
—
—
0.95

the message, participants completed a questionnaire that
measured six primary outcomes (understanding, belief,
personalization, deciding, milling, and fear). Standard
questionnaire items used in prior research (Gutteling 1993;
Lindell and Perry 2012) were employed when they existed
and there was evidence that the items had performed well.
Existing items were adapted to the context of the project.

OUTCOME SCALES
Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis was
conducted to create composite mean outcome scores for
four of the six outcomes (understanding, belief, personalization, and fear). Two measures (deciding and
milling) were measured as single items. Principal component analysis and oblimin rotation was used to assess
whether items reliably represented a single construct.
Six scales were extracted. Coefficient alpha values
ranged from 0.92 to 0.95. Descriptive statistics for the
outcome scales are presented in Table 2.

d. Measures
1) UNDERSTANDING
The understanding scale measured how well individuals thought they understood the message. The
scale included seven items: ‘‘After reading this message,
I understand: 1) what happened, 2) the risks, 3) what to
do to protect myself, 4) what location is affected, 5) who
the message is from, 6) when I am supposed to take
action to protect myself, and 7) how long I am supposed
to continue taking action to protect myself.’’ Each of the
items was rated on a 6-point scale, where 1 5 Do not
understand at all and 6 5 Understand fully.

2) BELIEF
The belief scale included three items. The specific
wording was: ‘‘After reading this message, do you believe that: 1) A tsunami is headed your way? 2) You
should immediately move to high ground? and
3) Moving to high ground will make you safer?’’ Each of
the items was rated on a 6-point scale, where 1 5 Do not
believe and 6 5 Believe.

3) PERSONALIZATION
The personalization scale included seven items. The
specific wording was: ‘‘If I received this message on
my cell phone, I would think that: 1) I might become
injured, 2) people I know might become injured,
3) people I do not know might become injured, 4) I might
die, 5) people I know might die, 6) people I do not
know might die, and 7) the message was meant for
me.’’ Each of the items was rated on a 6-point scale,
where 1 5 Extremely unlikely and 6 5 Extremely
likely.

4) MILLING
Participants were asked one question that tapped into
their willingness to engage in quick, efficient, protective
behaviors: ‘‘How likely would you be to take action to
protect yourself before confirming the information
somewhere else?’’ This item was rated on a 6-point
scale, where 1 5 Very unlikely and 6 5 Very likely.
Higher scores indicated less milling and quicker
protective action.

5) TIME TO TAKE PROTECTIVE ACTION
Participants were also asked ‘‘How much time did you
believe you had before you should begin taking actions?’’ Each participant indicated their response in
hours and minutes, and data were converted to one total
score in minutes.

6) DECIDING
Deciding was measured with one item: ‘‘The message
will help me decide what to do.’’ This item was rated on a
6-point scale, where 1 5 Strongly disagree and 6 5
Strongly agree.

7) FEAR
Participants rated four items (afraid, scared, anxious,
frightened) using a 7-point rating scale where 1 5 None
of this feeling and 7 5 A great deal of this feeling. These
four items converged to form a mean scale labeled as
‘‘Fear.’’

JANUARY 2018

81

SUTTON ET AL.
TABLE 3. Mean message outcomes by group.

Scale

Standard
(n 5 113)
M (SD)

Revised
(n 5 111)
M (SD)

Constrained
(n 5 93)
M (SD)

Sequenced
(n 5 84)
M (SD)

Understanding
Belief
Personalization
Milling
Minutes to take action
Deciding
Fear

4.73a (0.94)
4.68 (1.16)
4.20 (1.14)
4.47 (1.33)
155.79 (109.17)
4.66 (1.16)
4.71 (1.52)

4.95a (1.03)
5.05 (1.04)
4.40 (1.32)
4.70 (1.24)
126.39 (85.88)
5.06a (1.24)
5.13a (1.45)

4.27b (1.32)
4.61 (1.44)
4.26 (1.41)
4.32 (1.40)
174.31 (118.74)
4.41b (1.47)
4.41b (1.86)

4.82a (1.15)
4.89 (1.34)
4.53 (1.30)
4.71 (1.53)
166.17 (142.31)
4.86 (1.42)
4.81 (1.83)

Means with differing superscripts are significantly different at the p , 0.05 level.

e. Data analysis

b. Belief

One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to
assess the effect of messages on each outcome. Post hoc
analysis was conducted using Scheffe’s test (Tabachnick
and Fidell 2007), except in cases where the homogeneity
of variance assumption was violated. Cell sizes were
relatively equal. Although ANOVA is typically robust
in the presence of violations, the Games–Howell procedure were employed in those cases, as this test was
designed for situations involving unequal variances
(Field 2013).

There also was a significant effect of message type on
belief (F [3, 397] 5 2.77; p 5 0.04; h2p 5 0.02). However,
Games–Howell post hoc tests did not indicate significant
differences between messages. The differences between
the revised message (M 5 5.05; SD 5 1.04) and the
standard message (M 5 4.68; SD 5 1.16; p 5 0.055) and
between the revised message and the constrained message (M 5 4.61; SD 5 1.44; p 5 0.069) approached significance. Examination of the means showed that the
revised message resulted in the highest levels of belief,
followed by the sequenced message, the original message, and the constrained message.

4. Results
One-way ANOVA was used to examine whether selfreported understanding, belief, personalization, milling,
deciding, and fear were functions of the type of message
viewed. The independent variable represented the
four different message types: 1) standard, 2) revised,
3) constrained, and 4) sequenced. The dependent variables were understanding, belief, personalization, milling, deciding, and fear scores. See Table 3 for means and
standard deviations for each of the four groups.

a. Understanding
There was a significant effect of message type on understanding (F [3, 397] 5 6.851; p , 0.001; h2p 5 0.05).
This effect can be characterized as small to medium.
Games–Howell post hoc results indicated that the constrained message (M 5 4.27; SD 5 1.32) resulted in less
understanding than the standard message (M 5 4.73;
SD 5 0.94; p 5 0.003), revised message (M 5 4.95; SD 5
1.03; p , 0.001), and sequenced message (M 5 4.82;
SD 5 1.15; p 5 0.001). The revised message did not
cause significantly more understanding than the standard or sequenced message; however, examination of
the means showed slightly more understanding for the
revised and the sequenced messages than the standard
message.

c. Personalization
There was no effect of message type on personalization (F [3, 397] 5 1.25; p 5 0.29; h2p 5 0.009), indicating
that people who received different types of messages
personalized the warnings in a similar manner. Personalization was high (above 4.2) in all conditions.

d. Milling
There was no effect of message type on milling
(F [3, 397] 5 1.844; p 5 0.14; h2p 5 0.014), indicating
that the message variations did not influence whether
participants would engage in confirming the message
before taking protective action. Notably, in all message
conditions, individuals indicated high levels of intent to
take protective action (4.32 or above) before confirming.
Participants in the sequenced condition indicated the
highest level of taking protective action before confirming (M 5 4.71; SD 5 1.53), followed by the revised
(M 5 4.70; SD 5 1.24), standard (M 5 4.47; SD 5 1.33),
and constrained (M 5 4.32; SD 5 1.40) conditions.

e. Time to take protective action
There was a significant effect of message type on the
total number of minutes that participants believed were
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available in which to take protective action to protect
themselves (F [3, 397] 5 3.186; p 5 0.024; h2p 5 0.024).
However, Games–Howell post hoc tests did not indicate
significant differences between message conditions, although differences between the constrained condition
(M 5 174.31; SD 5 118.74) and the revised condition
(M 5 126.39; SD 5 85.88; p 5 0.081), and between the
constrained condition and the sequenced condition
(M 5 166.17; SD 5 142.31; p 5 0.082) approached significance. In general, participants indicated that they
would act relatively quickly (responding within two to
three hours).

f. Deciding
There was a significant effect of message type on deciding (F [3, 397] 5 4.5; p 5 0.004; h2p 5 0.033), indicating
participants did vary significantly in their perceived
ability to make a decision as a result of the message
conditions. Games–Howell post hoc tests indicated that
participants receiving the revised message reported
significantly more ability to decide whether to take
protective action (M 5 5.06; SD 5 1.24) than participants receiving the constrained message (M 5 4.41;
SD 5 1.47; p 5 0.005) and participants receiving
the original message (M 5 4.66; SD 5 1.16), although this
latter difference only approached significance ( p 5 0.066).

g. Fear
There was a significant effect of message type on fear
(F [3, 397] 5 3.303; p 5 0.02; h2p 5 0.024). Games–
Howell post hoc tests indicated that the revised message
caused significantly more fear (M 5 5.13; SD 5 1.45)
compared to the constrained message (M 5 4.41; SD 5
1.86; p 5 0.014). However, fear did not vary significantly
among other message conditions.

5. Discussion
Effective tsunami warnings are essential to limit the
loss of life that may occur when these events happen.
The results from this study suggest that existing tsunami
warning messages can be improved by including more
specific information about the geographical location and
population under threat, clearly explaining the potential
impact of tsunami, and providing specific guidance
about protective actions that should be taken by populations at risk. Although the effect sizes are small, when
applied across the large populations that may need to be
reached in the event of a catastrophic tsunami, these
changes have the potential to increase protective action
measures taken by the public and save lives. While this
research was conducted on a distant-source tsunami
threat, prior research (Bean et al. 2016; Lindell and
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Perry 2012; Mileti and Sorensen 1990) suggests that our
findings likely apply to other hazards in general as well
as those with short response times that require quick
decision-making with little time to seek additional
information.
Furthermore, the results provide insight into using
short messages to communicate warnings. These results
suggest that while a single, short message may have
some effect, this type of message is not as successful as
messages that include more information. In this study,
participants who only saw a single, short message reported significantly less understanding, fear, and ability
to decide, compared to participants who received the
revised message.
This result, however, should not be interpreted to
mean that warnings should not be sent via short messages such as Twitter or WEA. Rather, it may be more
effective to send short messages in a distributed fashion
on these message systems. Our results showed that the
sequenced 140-character set of messages was as effective
as the revised, longer-length message. Thus, even when
technology limits the length of messages, our findings
demonstrate that public officials can send messages to
mobile devices in a way that circumvents these constraints by sending a series of related messages that include more information than a single shorter message
and are more effective. To our knowledge, this research
is the first to have demonstrated the potential value of
sequenced warning messages.
Our finding that longer messages that included more
information had better outcomes is consistent with research by Wood et al. (2017), who examined the effect of
amount of information on outcomes for an improvised
nuclear device warning. Our study extends that research
by examining a different hazard type and by including
fear, an affective precursor to protective action. Moreover, our research compares three different approaches
to writing longer messages: 1) actual messages that are
sent by federal agencies, 2) actual messages that are
revised to enhance specificity and clarity, and 3) actual
messages that are revised to enhance specificity and
clarity and that are delivered as a sequenced set of
shorter messages.
Importantly, across all four message conditions, we
found no differential effects for intended milling, that
is, the desire to confirm the message before taking
protective action. In other words, message content
and length did not differentially affect people’s intent
to seek confirmation response to a tsunami warning
message. These data indicated that, overall, participants perceived strong intent to act, regardless of
which of the four randomly assigned messages they
had read.
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A key implication of this research is that it remains
imperative that emergency communicators continue to
develop mastery in writing messages that are not only
clear and succinct but that also convey the threat as well
as the necessary steps to mitigating the threat. This may
involve consideration of sending longer messages,
sending sequenced messages, including messages with
links to further information, and developing message
templates in advance that can be used as an event
unfolds.

6. Limitations and future research
There are some limitations to this study, which should
be addressed in future research. First, this study assessed
emotions, cognitive shifts, and behavioral intention in
response to an imagined scenario using a controlled
experimental design. The use of an experimental design,
which includes randomization to message condition,
helps reduce the likelihood that there will be baseline
differences between groups on participant characteristics such as prior hazard knowledge (Babbie 2016). We
collected information about prior disaster experience
and found no differences between groups (see Table 1).
Owing to concerns about response burden, however, we
did not assess prior knowledge of the hazard; therefore,
we cannot be certain that there were no preexisting
group differences in tsunami knowledge. Although experimental designs maximize internal validity by controlling for baseline differences between groups (Babbie
2016) and have been used successfully to investigate
warning messages (Frisby et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2017),
future research should investigate the effects of tsunami
warning messages during real-world events to strengthen
the external validity of our findings. Furthermore, this
scenario depicted a distant-source event, which would
allow for additional time for both the development of a
long form message that can be sent in a single shot or in
sequence. A local source event would not allow the development of a long message, nor time for information
seeking before decision-making. Therefore, future research is needed to investigate responses to near-field
tsunami messages. Likewise, future research should examine the effect of prior hazard knowledge on warning
outcomes.
Second, our focus has been on a single, largely unfamiliar hazard. Globally, few individuals have experience with this threat except vicariously through media
accounts of large-scale, high-impact events. In addition,
recommended protective actions for tsunami threat are
not terribly complicated; the goal for those at risk is to
get to higher ground as quickly as possible. In contrast,
people at risk from other hazards may have different

83

recommended protective actions depending upon their
location and protective structure. Therefore, future experiments on warning message response for other hazards, such as hurricane, flood, and tornado, or less
familiar hazards, such as technological threats, should
examine the effects of using shorter messages and sequenced messages.
Third, in this study, we considered two types of message length—a long message and a constrained message,
delivered as a single shot or a series of 11 messages. We
did not investigate the possibility of a middle-range
message that is longer than 140 characters and shorter
than a full 1380 characters. Future research should investigate the possibility of an optimal message length
that can increase intent to take protective action. Additional testing should also be conducted on sequenced
messages delivered over constrained messaging channels. This study demonstrates that using sequenced
messages may be an effective strategy for delivering
warning messages. In this study, we numbered each
message in sequence (1/11, 2/11, etc.); however, future
research should investigate how participants might respond if messages are sent out of order or if messages are
not complete, as these outcomes are distinct possibilities
when messages are sequenced. Likewise, research
should examine whether the number of messages included in a sequenced set should be limited.
Fourth, this research investigated the effect of messages on emotions, specifically looking at fear. Our
findings indicated the presence of fear; however, because of concerns about respondent fatigue, we did not
assess how messages influenced perceived efficacy. Risk
communication scholarship suggests that fear, when
accompanied by high perceived efficacy, increases behavioral intentions (Witte 1992); future research should examine whether warning messages can increase protective
action responses by increasing perceived efficacy.

7. Conclusions
When warning members of the public about imminent
threats, risk communicators intend for people to take
action immediately in response to the warning messages
they receive. Therefore, individuals must believe that
the threat is real, that they are at risk, and that they have
the information necessary to make a decision about how
to respond. Indeed, the goal of much hazard warning
research has been to increase the persuasiveness of
messages in order to reduce the time spent searching for
more information before engaging in protective action.
The hope has been that a specific combination of message content and message style will lead to greater
compliance among those at risk, reducing the loss of life
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under severe conditions. Most importantly compliance
needs to be quick—action must happen fast.
Of great importance is the need for risk communicators to deliver messages that are highly specific and clear
about the hazard threat, its impact, and the protective
actions that should be taken, regardless of message
length. Messages must be understandable and useful for
people with varying levels of education and ability.
Furthermore, as risk communicators continue to use
channels that transmit shorter messages in order to relay
warnings in real time, greater attention should be given
to strategies to make these short messages more effective. In this study, a single, content-constrained warning
message, such as a 140-character message sent as a single
message, was the least successful strategy for delivering a
warning that would be understood or believed. The results of this study suggest that a series of short messages
may serve as a viable alternative for delivering additional
information that can help people to make decisions about
how to protect themselves. In light of this finding, public
communicators utilizing short messaging channels should
consider sending a series of messages rather than a single
message under conditions of imminent threat. Additional
research is critical to help clarify when and how sequenced messages can be most effective in reducing
death and injury.
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APPENDIX
Message 1: Original Tsunami Message
WWUS86 KEKA 111820
SPSEKA
SPECIAL WEATHER STATEMENT
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE EUREKA CA
1020 a.m. PST FRI MAR 11 2011
CAZ001–002–120030REDWOOD COAST-MENDOCINO COAST1020 a.m. PST FRI MAR 11 2011
. . .A TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN
EFFECT FOR DEL NORTE. . .HUMBOLDT AND
MENDOCINO COUNTIES COASTAL AREAS. . .
EARTHQUAKE
DATA.
PRELIMINARY
MAGNITUDE 8.9. LOCATION 38.2 NORTH 142.5
EAST. NEAR EAST COAST OF HONSHU JAPAN.
TIME 21:46 PST MAR 10, 2015. A TSUNAMI WAS
GENERATED AND HAS CAUSED DAMAGED
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ALONG THE DEL NORTE COUNTY, AND DAMAGE
ALONG THE HUMBOLDT AND MENDOCINO
COASTS IS STILL EXPECTED. PERSONS AT THE
COAST SHOULD BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS
FROM LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS.
DAMAGING WAVES HAVE BEEN OBSERVED
ACROSS HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. DAMAGING
WAVES HAVE ARRIVED AT CRESCENT CITY
HARBOR WHERE ALL DOCKS HAVE BEEN
DESTROYED. WAVES HAVE BROKEN OVER
THE SPIT AT STONE LAGOON. A 3-FOOT WAVE
HAS BEEN REPORTED IN HUMBOLDT BAY.
A 2–4 FOOT FLOOD WAVE WAS REPORTED
MOVING UP THE MAD RIVER AT 08:45 a.m. PST.
DAMAGING WAVES WILL CONTINUE FOR THE
NEXT SEVERAL HOURS.
MEASUREMENTS OR REPORTS OF TSUNAMI
WAVE ACTIVITY GAUGE LOCATION TIME
AMPLITUDE
CRESCENT CITY, CA 08:44 a.m. 8.1 FT, NORTH
SPIT HUMBOLDT 8:30 a.m. 3.1 FT, ARENA COVE
09:17 a.m. 5.3 FT.
REMEMBER. . .DO NOT BE FOOLED. . .TSUNAMI
WAVES CAN SEEM TO STOP FOR LONG PERIODS AND THEN BEGIN AGAIN. WAIT FOR
THE OFFICIAL ALL CLEAR TO RETURN TO
THREATENED AREAS.
IN DEL NORTE COUNTY. . .PEOPLE ARE
ORDERED TO EVACUATE TO ABOVE 9 TH
STREET. SHELTER LOCATIONS INCLUDE SMITH
RIVER ELEMENTARY. . .DEL NORTE HIGH
SCHOOL AND YUROK TRIBAL OFFICE IN
KLAMATH.
IN HUMBOLDT AND MENDOCINO COUNTIES. . .
PEOPLE ARE ADVISED TO STAY OFF
BEACHES. . .NOT TRAVEL BY WATERCRAFT
AND EVACUATE LOW LYING COASTAL
AREAS IMMEDIATELY UNTIL ADVISED
THAT IT IS SAFE TO RETURN.
PEOPLE SHOULD STAY CLEAR OF LOW LYING
AREAS ALONG COASTAL RIVERS AS TSUNAMI
WAVES CAN TRAVEL UP FROM THE MOUTH
OF COASTAL RIVERS.
BULLETINS WILL BE ISSUED HOURLY OR
SOONER IF CONDITIONS WARRANT TO KEEP
YOU INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS OF THIS
EVENT. IF AVAILABLE. . .REFER TO THE
INTERNET SITE HTTP://TSUNAMI.GOV FOR
MORE INFORMATION.
DUE TO RAPIDLY CHANGING CONDITIONS
ASSOCIATED
WITH
TSUNAMI
WAVE
ACTIVITY. . .LISTENERS ARE URGED TO TUNE
TO LOCAL EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM
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MEDIA FOR THE LATEST INFORMATION
ISSUED BY LOCAL DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
AUTHORITIES. THEY WILL PROVIDE DETAILS
ON THE EVACUATION OF LOW-LYING AREAS. . .IF
NECESSARY. . .AND WHEN IT IS SAFE TO RETURN
AFTER THE TSUNAMI HAS PASSED.

IF AVAILABLE, REFER TO TSUNAMI.GOV FOR
MORE INFORMATION.
THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 30
MINUTES OR SOONER.

Message 2: EPPM-Enhanced Tsunami Message

Emergency Alert.
@NWS EUREKA.
EVACUATE COASTAL AREAS IN MENDOCINO, HUMBOLDT, DEL NORTE COUNTIES.
TSUNAMI WARNING. DESTRUCTIVE WAVES
SIGHTED. WARNING EXPIRES 9:00 p.m. PDT.

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE EUREKA CA.
AN EARTHQUAKE WITH A PRELIMINARY
MAGNITUDE OF 8.9 OCCURRED NEAR THE
EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN AT 11:46 p.m.
PST MAR 10, 2015. IT HAS GENERATED A
TSUNAMI. INITIAL WAVES WERE DETECTED
AT 08:30 a.m. PDT MAR 11, 2015. DOCKS HAVE
BEEN DESTROYED AT CRESCENT CITY HARBOR.
DAMAGING WAVES HAVE BEEN SIGHTED IN
HUMBOLDT BAY AND MOVING UP THE MAD
RIVER. OTHER WAVES WILL STRIKE OVER MANY
HOURS. TSUNAMI WAVES CAN BE DEADLY AND
CAUSE INJURY AND WIDESPREAD DAMAGE.
THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT
FOR DEL NORTE, HUMBOLDT, AND MENDOCINO
COUNTY COASTAL AREAS. THIS INCLUDES
THE TOWNS OF CRESCENT CITY, KLAMATH,
EUREKA, ARCATA, TRINIDAD, FORT BRAGG,
GUALALA, AND WESTPORT.
IF YOU ARE ON OR NEAR A BEACH, IN A
LOW LYING COASTAL AREA, OR NEAR A
COASTAL RIVER ANYWHERE IN THE DEL
NORTE, HUMBOLDT, AND MENDOCINO COUNTY
COASTAL AREAS, YOU WILL BE SAFEST IF
YOU IMMEDIATELY GET TO HIGH GROUND
OF AT LEAST 50 FEET OR MORE. IF YOU
CANNOT REACH HIGH GROUND, EVACUATE
TO AN UPPER FLOOR OF A HIGH RISE
BUILDING, IF ONE IS AVAILABLE. DO NOT
TRAVEL BY WATERCRAFT. TSUNAMI WAVES
MAY BE FILLED WITH DEBRIS, WHICH CAN
INJURE OR KILL PEOPLE AND WEAKEN OR
DESTROY STRUCTURES.
IF YOU SEE THE OCEAN WATER PULL BACK
AND EXPOSE THE SEA FLOOR, RUN TO HIGH
GROUND AS FAST AS YOU CAN BECAUSE A
TSUNAMI WILL STRIKE IN A FEW MOMENTS. IF
YOU ARE NOT IN A TSUNAMI IMPACT AREA,
STAY AWAY. ONCE YOU ARE IN A SAFE
LOCATION, STAY THERE UNTIL ADVISED
BY OFFICIALS THAT IT IS SAFE TO LEAVE.
KEEP LISTENING TO YOUR LOCAL MEDIA
AND EMERGENCY OFFICIALS FOR MORE
INFORMATION AND ADDITIONAL UPDATES.

Message 3: Constrained, 140-Character Tsunami
Message

Message 4. EPPM-Enhanced, Sequenced Tsunami
Message
Emergency Alert
NWS EUREKA, CA. TSUNAMI WARNING. A
MAGNITUDE 8.9 EARTHQUAKE OCCURRED
NEAR JAPAN AT 11:46 p.m. PST JULY 24, 2015.
(MESSAGE 1 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
INITIAL WAVES WERE DETECTED AT 0830 a.m.
PDT JUL 25, 2015. DOCKS HAVE BEEN
DESTROYED AT CRESCENT CITY HARBOR.
(MESSAGE 2 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
DAMAGING WAVES HAVE BEEN SIGHTED
IN HUMBOLDT BAY AND MOVING UP THE
MAD RIVER. OTHER WAVES WILL STRIKE
OVER MANY HOURS AND MAY BE DEADLY.
(MESSAGE 3 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
THE TSUNAMI WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR
DEL NORTE, HUMBOLDT and MENDOCINO
COUNTY COASTAL AREAS INCLUDING
CRESCENT CITY, KLAMATH, EUREKA and
ARCATA (MESSAGE 4 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
IF YOU ARE ON OR NEAR A BEACH IN A LOW
LYING COASTAL OR RIVER TSUNAMI IMPACT
AREA, GO NOW TO HIGH GROUND AT LEAST
50 FEET ABOVE SEA LEVEL (MESSAGE 5 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
IF YOU ARE IN AN IMPACT AREA AND
CANNOT REACH HIGH GROUND, GO TO AN
UPPER FLOOR OF A TALL BUILDING. STAY
OFF BEACHES. DO NOT USE WATERCRAFT.
(MESSAGE 6 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
TSUNAMI WAVES MAY BE FILLED WITH
DEBRIS, WHICH CAN INJURE OR KILL PEOPLE
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AND WEAKEN OR DESTROY STRUCTURES.
(MESSAGE 7 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
IF YOU SEE THE OCEAN WATER PULL BACK
AND EXPOSE THE SEA FLOOR, RUN TO HIGH
GROUND AS FAST AS YOU CAN BECAUSE A
TSUNAMI IS ABOUT TO STRIKE (MESSAGE 8
OF 11)
Emergency Alert
IF YOU ARE NOT IN A TSUNAMI IMPACT
AREA, STAY AWAY. ONCE YOU ARE IN A SAFE
LOCATION, STAY THERE UNTIL OFFICIALS
ADVISE IT IS SAFE TO LEAVE. (MESSAGE 9 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
LISTEN TO YOUR LOCAL MEDIA AND
EMERGENCY OFFICIALS FOR ADDITIONAL
TSUNAMI UPDATES. IF AVAILABLE, REFER
TO TSUNAMI.GOV FOR MORE INFORMATION
(MESSAGE 10 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
TSUNAMI WARNING MESSAGES WILL BE
UPDATED EVERY 30 MINUTES OR SOONER.
(MESSAGE 11 OF 11)
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